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Abstract 
This paper considers two aspects of this question. First, Brexit has already induced a 
devaluation of sterling of around 14 per cent since June 2016, which has started to work through 
to consumer prices: between June 2016 and July 2017 consumer prices increased by around 
2.5 per cent. Second, while it is not government policy, nor the desire of the UK public, that 
the outcome of negotiations is a ‘MFN Brexit’, this remains a distinct possibility. Thus we ask 
how the imposition of tariffs on imports from the EU will work through into consumer prices. 
Making very conservative assumptions, we conclude that ‘MFN Brexit’ will increase the 
average cost of living by around 1 per cent and increase it for 8 per cent of households by 2 per 
cent or more. We present results for different groups of households according to their 
employment and structural characteristics and show that the impact will generally be largest 
on unemployed, single parent and pensioner households. 
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1. Introduction 
The point of economic policy is to increase citizens’ welfare, and while individuals’ real 
incomes are not the only criterion on which we might judge this, they are certainly the dominant 
one. Most of the analysis of Brexit has concerned its effects on exports, production and earned 
incomes, and this is undoubtedly the main way in which it will ultimately impinge on UK 
residents. However, it will also have direct effects on the cost of living which are of interest 
both per se and particularly to people whose incomes are sticky, such as those on benefits or 
pensions. Our question, therefore, is to what extent Brexit will increase the UK cost of living. 
We analyse two forces that influence the cost of living, and consider their effects on households 
with different family and employment profiles. First, Brexit has already had a significant effect 
on the exchange rate, with a devaluation of sterling of around 14 per cent since June 2016. This 
has started to work through to consumer prices and so we analyse the incidence of actual price 
changes since June 2016. There will, of course, have been other influences on prices, but there 
is little doubt that the Brexit-induced devaluation has been the major one over this period. 
Second, we consider future trade policy. Although UK government policy is to seek a deep and 
special relationship with the EU, which would preserve many of the features that render current 
UK–EU trade costs so low, this is, at present, very far from being assured. Negotiations have 
to finish by about October 2018 in order to allow any agreement to be signed and ratified. The 
UK has only started to spell out its negotiating objectives in August 2017, but these often lacked 
concreteness and were poorly aligned with the negotiating objectives in the rest of the EU.1 
UK politics remain as fractured as ever over Brexit, with divisions at every level from the 
Cabinet downwards and in the opposition Labour Party; the government lacks a majority and 
there are several veto points that could delay (and hence prevent) an agreement. Thus while it 
is not policy, nor the desire of the public, a Brexit with little cooperation on trade between the 
UK and EU remains a distinct possibility. 
Under such a Brexit, the UK and the EU will be obliged by WTO rules to impose the same 
tariffs on their mutual trade as they impose on imports from the countries with which they 
currently have no free trade agreements. 
Given the UK government’s intention not to change tariffs from current levels, we model this 
as levying the current EU most favoured nation tariffs on UK imports from the EU, for which 
reason we term it a ‘MFN Brexit’. By limiting ourselves to just one dimension of Brexit we 
cannot comment on the overall costs or benefits of the policy. Moreover, for several technical 
reasons, which we outline below, our estimates of the cost of living effects are certainly too 
conservative. 
Clearly, Brexit is a sufficiently large shock that it will have general equilibrium implications 
for the UK economy, whereby trade shocks affect production and incomes as well as prices, 
and in an ideal world we would wish to take the former into account as well as the price effects. 
However, computable general equilibrium models require high levels of aggregation across 
3 
 
commodities if they are to be manageable, which means that they cannot take account of the 
necessary (and available) detail on both prices and consumption, on the one hand, and 
international trade and tariffs, on the other. Thus in this paper we opt for a different approach 
and undertake a series of partial equilibrium simulations that better exploit the disaggregated 
data on consumption and trade policies. 
We take trade and tariff data on over 5,000 trade headings, distil them into 18 fresh-food and 
122 other commodity groups, for each of which we model the trade-offs in UK consumption 
between five broad sources of supply. When tariffs are imposed on goods from the EU, 
consumers can avoid some of the impact by switching to other sources; taking this into account 
we see how the overall price of consumption varies for each of these groups. We then 
disaggregate these estimates into the 215 categories of goods recognised in the consumer 
expenditure data and finally apply the price changes at this level to the baskets of consumption 
typical of different groups of households. 
The trade-off between the economic completeness of general equilibrium and the policy and 
behavioral detail available in partial equilibrium cannot be resolved a priori. We also note that 
in this exercise we have to combine data from several different sources and classifications and 
that this introduces multiple opportunities for inaccuracy. Nonetheless, we believe that this 
exercise, the most detailed available to date, provides useful insight even if the results should 
not be viewed as precise point estimates. 
The next section analyses the impact of devaluation of sterling and the incidence of consumer 
price changes since June 2016. The third section discusses the model and the data used for 
simulating the impact of tariff changes on consumer prices. Section 4 discusses the results and 
looks at the distributional impact of ‘MFN Brexit’. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Devaluation 
Before we attempt to model what impact future price changes will have on living standards we 
first look at how consumer prices have changed since the referendum. In particular, we will 
trace out how the devaluation of sterling has fed through into price changes for different goods 
and how, as a result of this, different groups have been affected. 
The value of sterling impacts on the price of most goods, particularly those which are heavily 
imported. The speed at which changes in the exchange rate feed through into import prices and 
the degree to which domestic prices for specific goods are affected depends on a number of 
factors, including what is driving movements in the exchange rate.2 
There have been two large devaluations of sterling in the past decade. The first between 
December 2007 and December 2008 saw sterling decline by 23 per cent (on a trade-weighted 
basis).3 The second, following the EU Referendum, saw sterling decline by 14 per cent between 
23 June 2016 and mid-August 2017. In both periods we can look at the change in the prices of 
various consumer goods. 
Table 1 shows the change in the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing 
costs (CPIH) in the two periods and the change in the inflation rate of various categories of 
goods. Although the impact of a devaluation on prices is likely to persist beyond 14 months we 
analyse 14-month  periods  here, because at the time of writing we do not have data beyond 
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August 2017 and we wish to be consistent across cases. Notwithstanding this important caveat, 
it is clear that while inflation increased in both periods the prices of products reacted differently. 
Annual food and drink inflation, which, based on import intensity, is relatively sensitive to 
changes in the value of sterling, rose by between 6 and 5 percentage points in both periods. By 
contrast in the earlier period transport inflation fell by 7 percentage points whereas in 2016–17 
it rose by 3 percentage points. Such differences speak to the fact that as well as a devaluation, 
other forces also influence consumer prices. In the first period the price of oil (an important 
component in transport costs) fell by 50 per cent, whereas in the second period it rose by 4 per 
cent. 
 
Table 1: Change in CPIH, December 2007-08 and June 2016-17 
 
Source: ONS, UK Consumer Price Inflation. 
 
We cannot completely isolate the impact of the decline in the value of sterling, but the 
devaluation that followed the vote to leave the EU provides a good natural experiment for what 
can happen to prices following an exchange rate change that is not linked to broader economic 
change. Unlike the devaluation in 2007, the recent decline was not associated with a decline in 
the prospects for the global economy and there was no obvious cause other than the result of 
the referendum. 
Figure 1 below shows how the experience of the UK differed from other advanced economies 
in this regard. Although the UK, US and the Eurozone experienced rising consumer prices 
between May 2016 and February 2017, inflation subsequently fell back in the US and Eurozone 
in the first half of this year. By contrast inflation has continued to rise in the UK. All three 
economies were affected by the rising oil price in the second half of 2016, but only the UK 
experienced a sharp drop in its effective exchange rate and as a result inflation has continued 
to rise while it stalled in the US and Eurozone. 
 
December 2007 - 
February 2009
June 2016 - 
August 2017
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 6.0% 5.2% 28.6%
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 3.0% 4.0% 5.4%
Clothing and footwear -5.5% 5.3% 41.4%
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 2.7% 0.5% 0.2%
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 2.5% 4.8% 24.5%
Health -0.9% -0.3% 16.6%
Transport -6.8% 3.4% 15.4%
Communication 3.1% -1.5% 37.3%
Recreation and culture 1.6% 1.0% 19.5%
Education -4.5% -0.4% 0.5%
Restaurants and hotels 0.1% 1.2% 0.4%
Miscellaneous goods and services 1.2% 0.9% 11.3%
CPIH (overall index) 0.8% 1.9%
Ppts change in annual CPIH inflation
Average import 
intensity
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Figure 1: Consumer price inflation for selected comparator economies 
 
Source: OECD, Consumer Price Inflation. 
 
Figure 2 shows what has been driving the rise in inflation since the referendum. The biggest 
single contributor – in large part because of the rise in the oil price in the second half of 2016 
– has been transport. However, the prices of food, drink and clothing have risen faster and 
despite each comprising a smaller share of typical household spending each has contributed a 
similar amount to the rise in CPIH as transport. Together they have accounted for 37 per cent 
of the rise in inflation. 
 
Figure 2: Contributions to annual change in CPIH inflation rate, July 2016-August 2017 
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Source: ONS, UK Consumer Price Inflation. 
Differences in the inflation rates of different items determine which groups of households are 
most affected. Table 2 below provides a detailed look at the differences in spending between 
households distinguished by their employment status, household composition and whether they 
are headed by a working-age person or a pensioner. 
Households headed by an unemployed person spend a significantly larger share of their total 
spending on food and drink (20 per cent), as do pensioner households (17 per cent), compared 
to those headed by someone in full-time work (12 per cent) and are thus more seriously affected 
when the price of food and drink rises. By contrast, the recent rise in the cost of clothing and 
footwear has hit couples with children and those in full- or part-time work harder. 
 
Table 2: Composition of consumers’ expenditure by household type 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations of ONS, Living Costs and Food Survey 2015-16. 
To derive inflation rates for different types of household, we merge the price data provided by 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) as part of their Consumer Price Inflation series and the 
     Share of total spending
Employed 
full-time
Employed 
part-time Unemployed Single
Single 
parent Couple
Couple 
with 
children
Working 
age Pensioner
Average 
working-age 
household
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 9.2% 10.9% 15.3% 13.8% 11.3% 13.6% 10.2% 10.5% 13.6% 10.5%
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 3.1% 3.7% 5.2% 4.0% 4.7% 3.8% 3.3% 3.7% 3.8% 3.7%
Clothing and footwear 4.4% 4.5% 3.4% 3.0% 3.4% 3.3% 4.8% 4.4% 3.3% 4.4%
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 19.9% 23.5% 29.6% 26.2% 29.1% 21.5% 18.5% 21.5% 21.5% 21.5%
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 5.3% 4.9% 4.7% 6.6% 4.9% 6.5% 5.2% 5.1% 6.5% 5.1%
Health 1.0% 1.3% 0.6% 1.8% 0.9% 1.7% 1.1% 1.0% 1.7% 1.0%
Transport 15.0% 11.8% 9.6% 7.6% 10.0% 9.7% 14.6% 13.3% 9.7% 13.3%
Communication 2.7% 3.0% 3.9% 3.4% 3.4% 2.9% 2.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
Recreation and culture 13.3% 12.7% 10.0% 12.0% 11.4% 14.1% 13.5% 12.9% 14.1% 12.9%
Education 0.8% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 1.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.8%
Restaurants and hotels 11.0% 9.3% 6.2% 6.5% 8.6% 8.1% 11.0% 10.3% 8.1% 10.3%
Miscellaneous goods and services 14.4% 13.7% 11.5% 15.2% 12.1% 14.8% 14.3% 13.7% 14.8% 13.7%
Economic status of the HRP Household composition Age
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data on the consumption patterns of different groups from the Living Costs and Food Survey 
(LCFS). The LCFS is an annual household survey that provides detailed information on weekly 
spending across over 400 goods and services coupled with a range of demographic and 
economic indicators. The price data are available for the same goods and services. In 
combining the data, we assume that all households face the same price changes. That is to say 
that if the price of beef rises by 2 per cent we assume all households that consume beef pay 2 
per cent more for it. In reality households consume different types of beef, from different 
outlets and some may change their consumption of beef as a result of price changes. However 
in the absence of price information by household assuming homogeneity is unavoidable. 
Figure 3 shows the inflation rates for different groups of households six months after the 
referendum and as of August 2017. Since the referendum the various groups of households 
have experienced broadly similar increases in inflation (between 2.7 and 2.9 per cent). In the 
first six months after the referendum households with children and those headed by someone 
in work were experiencing greater inflation; however, over the course of the past six months, 
unemployed and pensioner households have been most affected as the prices of essentials such 
as food, drink and clothing have risen fastest. 
 
Figure 3: Inflation experienced by different households and overall CPIH inflation rate 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The relatively rapid increase in inflation since the referendum has had a measurable impact on 
living standards. Although different households have experienced similar rates of inflation, 
income growth for these groups has differed. Nominal wage growth in the year to July 2017 
was 2 per cent, the state pension was uprated by 2.5 per cent in April 2017, the disability 
element of Employment Support Allowance was uprated by 1 per cent and most other working-
age benefits were frozen. Working-age households who get most of their income from earnings 
or working-age benefits have experienced inflation significantly above their income growth.  
Unemployed households, for whom benefit income is likely to be particularly important, are 
likely to have seen the lowest real income growth. By contrast pensioner households – who on 
average receive 45 per cent of their income through benefits, predominantly the state pension 
– will have fared slightly better as their pension is likely to have kept pace with the inflation 
they have experienced. 
The recent rise in consumer prices has been driven, in large part, by the Brexit-induced 
devaluation in sterling. It is not inconceivable that an ‘MFN Brexit’ would induce further 
exchange rate changes, but rather to speculate we now consider the effect of the tariff changes 
that will occur if the UK were to exit the EU without a free trade agreement – a so-called ‘MFN 
Brexit’. 
 
3. Modelling ‘MFN Brexit’ 
As noted in the introduction, a ‘MFN Brexit’ in which the UK imposes MFN tariffs on imports 
from the EU and manages rather little co-operation on other aspects of trade remains a 
possibility even if not an objective. In this section we describe how we trace the effects of these 
tariffs through to the prices of final consumption goods in the UK. 
 
3.1. The Multi-Market Simulation Model 
This analysis is built around a multi-market model that allocates demand for a product in 
several markets across several sources according to their relative prices.4 Since our concern is 
with UK consumption alone, however, we do not exploit the full capability of this model, but 
rather focus just on the allocation of UK demand across five groups of suppliers. These are the 
UK, the remainder of the EU (EU27), the rest of High-Income countries (RHIC – comprising 
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States), 
Emerging Markets (EM – China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) and a residual Rest of 
the World (RoW). The RHIC and EM groups are limited by data availability because the full 
model requires production data by sector and the listed countries are the only ones for which 
these are available.5 
Across all the sectors we model, domestic suppliers satisfy 44 per cent of total UK demand – 
and 56 per cent of total UK demand is met by overseas suppliers: 35 per cent from the EU, 5 
per cent from RHIC, 9 per cent from the EM and 6 per cent from the rest of the world. 
As in most trade models, demand is assumed to derive from an Armington structure 
(Armington, 1969), in which products are differentiated by place of production (so that UK 
washing machines are slightly different from EU27 ones) and demand for any product is 
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allocated across the varieties from different sources according to a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function. This implies that taken as a group, UK consumers like a 
mix of all the different suppliers’ varieties of any given product – a ‘love of variety’ 
assumption. 
The model estimates the expected impact of a change in tariffs on prices, recognising that the 
shares of suppliers in final sales will change. In principle, starting from actual purchases of a 
particular product in a base year, we change the tariffs imposed on supplies from the EU, allow 
consumers to substitute between different sources, and then calculate the change in the 
aggregate price index of supplies of this product. In fact, we can do all this in one step to derive 
the change in the price index directly. 
The critical parameters of this set-up are the elasticity of substitution between different varieties 
of the same product and the price elasticity of demand for each product in aggregate. The 
elasticity of substitution is set at –5 for all manufacturing industries, a fairly common value 
used in the literature (Fujita et al., 2000). For fresh foodstuffs, we use an elasticity of 
substitution of –10 to reflect the strong substitutability for primary products. The elasticities of 
demand at the product level are set at –1.5, where most models use a value of between –1 and 
–1.5 (Kee et al., 2008). 
On the supply side, we assume that each variety is supplied by a perfectly competitive industry 
that is subject to (mildly) rising marginal costs.6 The supply elasticity of UK suppliers to the 
UK market is set at 6 for manufacturing industries and 3 for fresh foodstuffs to reflect land and 
labour constraints. The elasticities for foreign suppliers to the UK market are set equal to 15 – 
the larger elasticities reflecting the relatively small size of the UK market compared to these 
regions’ overall supply. 
The assumption that the supply curves for imported goods are not affected by Brexit is 
appropriate for non-UK sources, because the Brexit shock is so minor relative to the other 
determinants of their costs. It is less innocuous for the UK, however. While we capture 
movements along the supply curve as output levels change, the imposition of tariffs on inputs 
into UK production and the general equilibrium consequences of Brexit are likely to raise UK 
production costs – i.e. to shift UK supply curves upwards. Imported intermediates account for 
5–10 per cent of the gross value of output in most UK industries and omitting the effects of 
tariffs on these leads us unambiguously to understate the increases in consumer prices.7 Thus, 
for example, tariffs on cotton are likely to affect the cost of clothing, but we model only the 
effect of the tariff on articles of clothing per se. 
 
3.2. Data 
The modelling is based on several detailed datasets, including the OECD Structural and 
Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS) and the UNIDO INDSTAT4 for production data, the 
UN COMTRADE (trade), the UNCTAD TRAINS (tariffs), the FAO database (agricultural 
production and trade data), the UK Input- Output Tables and the UK Living Costs and Food 
Survey (LCFS, which has been described above). Each of these datasets is based on its own 
classification and these need to be reconciled with each other. This process inevitably involves 
a good deal of approximation (see section 3.3 below) and while it undoubtedly leads to 
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inaccuracies in individual estimates, it probably does not affect the overall estimate of the effect 
of Brexit on the cost of living too much.8 
 
3.2.1. Production Data 
For manufactured products, including manufactured, processed and preserved foodstuffs (such 
as bread, butter, cheese, bacon and ham), production data (in US dollar terms) have been 
collected at the 4-digit level of ISIC Revision 4 (ISIC4) from the OECD Structural and 
Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS) database and the UNIDO INDSTAT4 database.9 The 
former is restricted to the OECD member countries, but contains production data up to 2015. 
The latter has a more comprehensive country coverage (79 countries) but only up to 2013. To 
match the consumption data available at the outset of the exercise, we need production for 
2014, which we can take directly from SDBS for OECD countries. For non- OECD countries, 
we collect INDSTAT4 data for 2013 (occasionally earlier) and gross them up by the growth in 
those countries’ exports between 2013 and 2014. 
The OECD and UNIDO data do not include fresh foodstuffs, such as fresh fruit and vegetables 
or rice, which require only minimal processing before consumption. For these products we use 
agricultural production data from the FAO.10 These data are reported according to the 
FAOSTAT Commodity List, from which we constructed commodity groups corresponding as 
directly as possible to those in the UK consumption data. To minimise the effects of agricultural 
price distortions, we work with the volume of production for these fresh foods. Since the latest 
FAO production data refer to 2013, the fresh food models has to use this year as base.11 
 
3.2.2. Trade and Tariff Data  
The trade and tariff data required to analyse ‘MFN Brexit’ have been collected from the World 
Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) website which gives access to several trade-
related databases.12 
Imports of manufactures come from the United Nations COMTRADE database. They refer to 
2014, are disaggregated by source, and are reported at the 6-digit level of Harmonised System 
2007 (HS2007).13 
For fresh foodstuffs trade data (in volume terms) have been collected from the FAO.14 These 
data are not, however, disaggregated by origin and destination, and so we allocated them across 
non-UK sources using COMTRADE data, aggregated from HS2007 trade sub- headings to 
FAO’s agricultural commodity classification using FAO’s converter. 
Data on tariffs come from UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) 
database. They are reported at the 6-digit HS Combined nomenclature and so have to be 
converted to HS2007 using WITS’ in-built product concordance.15 The model requires 
percentage, ad valorem, tariffs, which is the legal form of the majority of tariffs. In agriculture, 
however, a number are defined as specific duties.16 WITS converts specific duties to ad 
valorem equivalents using the average prices of imports.17 Given that the EU is typically a high 
cost supplier, the use of average import prices may lead to some over-statement of the ad 
valorem equivalent of the tariff for EU suppliers. 
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The base tariffs employed in the modelling are WITS’ effectively applied (AHS) rates, which 
allow for preferential agreements: they are import-weighted averages across suppliers on the 
assumption that all trade eligible for preferences takes advantage of them. When no preferential 
trade agreement is in place, they are the applied Most Favoured Nation, MFN, rates. 
The simulation tariffs were essentially identical to the base tariffs, with the exception of the 
UK applying tariffs on goods imported from the EU27. In the ‘MFN Brexit’ scenario – where 
the UK is assumed to trade with the EU on so-called ‘WTO terms’ – these are the current EU28 
applied MFN tariffs.18 Implicit in this is that imports from the countries with which the UK 
currently has Free Trade Agreements via its membership of the EU, continue to receive these 
preferences (as the government hopes, but has not yet ensured). In 2014, 13.6 per cent of UK 
imports came from these sources (UKTPO, 2016), and if the UK were not able to maintain the 
preferences, we will be further understating the price effects of ‘MFN Brexit’. 
It has been argued – for example, by Minford and Miller (2017) – that rather than increase 
tariffs on the EU, the UK should unilaterally remove all its tariffs. This is not currently UK 
policy and, for a variety of reasons, we believe that it should not be in the immediate future.19 
Thus we do not model removing tariffs in this paper, although we will do so elsewhere. 
It is important to stress that our estimates make no allowance for the effects of the almost 
inevitable increase in non-tariff frictions to UK–EU trade, such as the need for separate testing 
and certification processes, the possibility of imposing anti-dumping duties on trade and the 
transactions costs and delays resulting from the increased border formalities – recording and 
inspections – that will be necessary on the border. Especially if Brexit is to be a ‘hard’ one, 
with little UK–EU cooperation, these are likely to be quite significant – see, for example, 
Stojanovic and Rutter (2017). Thus our estimated impact of ‘MFN Brexit’ on the prices of 
consumption goods is very conservative. 
 
3.3. Conversions 
Because trade data are typically available at a highly disaggregated level, it is the availability 
of the production data that determines the level of sectoral disaggregation to which the model 
can be applied (Brenton and Winters, 1992). Most of the modelling is done at the 4-digit ISIC4 
level, so the trade and tariff inputs have to be aggregated from 6-digit HS2007 to ISIC4 using 
an OECD converter.20 We use imported weighted average tariffs at the ISIC4 level. 
As noted, we model fresh foodstuffs in categories defined directly in the consumer 
classification (which we refer to hereafter as COI+). The output and trade data for these are 
aggregated up from the FAOSTAT Commodity List data.21 The average tariffs are based on 
HS-level tariff data from UNCTAD TRAINS, but according to our own conversion from 
HS2007 directly to COI+ rather than FAO’s commodity definitions.22 
At the other end of the exercise, following the simulations, we need to disaggregate the 
manufacturing price effects from the ISIC4 groups into COI+ categories. We proceed on the 
basis that the price change of an ISIC4 group is the weighted average of the price changes of 
its component COI+ categories (i.e. ignoring certain complications about coverage and 
valuation that are spelt out in the Appendix) and that the price change for a category will be 
greater the larger the share of imports in its total consumption and the larger the tariff change 
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induced by ‘MFN Brexit’. The following ‘disaggregation formula’ which disaggregates the 
price change at group level into the changes at its component COI+ categories respects these 
three features (details in the Appendix):   
    𝑝?̂? =  𝛾 
𝑠𝑖
𝑚
𝑠𝑖
𝑐  𝑡?̂?                     (1) 
where pi is individual category price, ti is (1 + tariff on i), ^ denotes proportionate changes, γ is 
the elasticity of the group level price with respect to the group level tariff factor (1+ the tariff), 
𝑠𝑖
𝑚 is the share of category i in group imports and 𝑠𝑖
𝑐 the share of i in group consumption. That 
is, the price change for category i depends positively on the group level price change, the share 
of i in group imports and i’s tariff change, and negatively on i’s share of group consumption 
(because this reduces the importance of imports in total sales of i). 
The full flow of the tariff exercise is laid out schematically in  
Figure 4. The conversions and the unavoidable approximations involved in this process clearly 
reduce the reliability of any individual result, but, overall, we believe that the results are a 
reasonable reflection of the very conservative set of price effects we model for a ‘MFN Brexit’. 
We must also recognise, however, that, although our analysis of Brexit’s price effects is more 
detailed than any other we know of, each product is an average across many different sub-
products and varieties each of which may have different prices, tariffs and origins.  
 
Figure 4: Data and disaggregation schema 
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4. The Simulations 
As noted above, we take trade and tariff data on over 5,000 trade headings, distil them into 
over one hundred commodity groups, for each of which we model the trade-offs in UK 
consumption between five broad sources of supply (including domestic supplies). When tariffs 
are imposed on goods from the EU, consumers can avoid some of the impact by switching to 
other sources; taking this into account we see how the overall price of consumption varies for 
each of these groups. 
Of the 137 4-digit ISIC4 groups covering manufacturing, we model 122 for which reliable 
production data exist of which 65 map directly in to the personal consumption basket. That is, 
we make no further use of the results for the (57) groups that refer exclusively to intermediate 
inputs or capital goods used only by industry.23 
These excluded groups account for around 29 per cent of UK production. In addition, we have 
simulated a further 18 groups for fresh foodstuffs, whose coverage is defined directly in terms 
of COI+ categories. 
These 83 groups feed into the calculation of price changes for 215 COI+ categories referring 
to goods. The COI+ data distinguish 425 categories in total and the fact that we have to ignore 
any Brexit-induced price changes for services is another source of understatement. Finally, we 
take the 215 price changes and apply them to the baskets of consumption for different 
households, of which we have 5,000 (representative of the total UK population) in all.  
 
4.1. Tariff Pass-Through to the Consumer Prices 
Table 3 presents the main results on prices summarised in terms of 18 summary product 
groups.24  
Column 1 shows the considerable variation in the size of the EU’s MFN tariffs by group – 
which means that ‘MFN Brexit’ will impact on the prices of different consumption goods very 
differently. The largest tariff increase is for ‘dairy products’ for which an average tariff of 44.6 
per cent will be applied to imports from the EU, followed by ‘meat’, and ‘oils and fats’ – 37.0 
and 18.1 per cent respectively. Based on purchases reported by super- markets, the British 
Retail Consortium (2017) estimates that the weighted average tariff on food imports from the 
EU would be 22 per cent, which is in line with these estimates. Manufacturing and other non-
food items, on the other hand, face more modest tariff increases. Tariff change after Brexit will 
be smallest for ‘medical goods’ (0.1 per cent), and ‘fuel and energy’ an increase of 1.8 per cent 
on average. Tariffs on ‘transport vehicles and accessories’, including cars, motorcycles and 
bicycles, will see an average tariff rise of 7.7 per cent. 
The second determinant of the price increases caused by ‘MFN Brexit’ is the share of UK 
consumption that derives from the EU, which may be expressed in terms of the share of 
consumption that is imported and the share of imports from the EU. The data reported in 
column 2 refer to the share of imports in domestic sales that we have used in our modelling, 
passed, of course, through a series of converters and aggregators to get into these summary 
product groups.  These estimates of import penetration differ slightly from those given in UK 
Input-Output Tables for total sales (which are broader in coverage than ours) or for households’ 
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purchase (which are narrower).25 The most open groups include ‘clothing and footwear’, 
‘audiovisual equipment’, ‘fruit’, and ‘medical goods’. 
Turning to column 3’s EU share of imports we observe, again, considerable variation. EU 
shares are high in many food sectors – partly reflecting the high tariffs and other barriers levied 
by the EU against imports from the rest of the world – and also in ‘medical goods’ and 
‘transport vehicles and accessories’. In all these sectors, standards are important determinants 
of the right to sell in the UK so the high shares may reflect the effects of the Single Market. 
The product of the two ratios is the share of UK sales that comes from the EU. It is highest 
(above 50 per cent) for ‘medical goods’ and ‘transport vehicles and accessories’. Tariffs 
applied to EU goods will have the largest pass- through to UK consumer prices in these sectors. 
One last determinant of price change, not shown in table 3, is the way in which substitution 
between sources changes suppliers’ prices according to the elasticities of supply reported 
above. Demand is switched towards non-EU sources and, particularly for the UK where we 
assume lower elasticities of supply, this will drive up these sources’ supply prices to some 
extent. The opposite will happen to purchases from the EU: the decline in demand will slightly 
lower their supply price, so that the net effect is to increase their ‘landed’ price in the UK by a 
little less than the newly imposed MFN tariff. We model this, but there is one supply price 
effect that we cannot currently model. In a number of agricultural commodities the EU has 
excess supply and, in the absence of export subsidies, this tends to force the EU’s internal price 
(at which the UK currently buys) below the ‘world’ price plus the EU’s tariff. When the UK 
exits, it will have excess demand in most of these commodities and will purchase at the ‘world’ 
price plus that tariff; hence the actual increase in the price of its imports from the EU could 
exceed the newly imposed MFN tariff. 
 
Table 3: The derivation of the price effects of ‘MFN’ Brexit 
 
Change in 
tariff and 
trade costs 
Import 
penetration 
EU share 
of imports 
Price 
Change 
 % % % % 
Food:     
  Bread and cereals 18.0 13.2 92.7 1.8 
  Meat 37.0 29.5 78.4 5.8 
  Fish 13.3 47.2 28.3 1.5 
  Dairy products 44.6 27.5 98.1 8.1 
  Oils and fats 18.1 79.7 56.7 7.8 
  Fruit 10.6 85.7 44.1 3.1 
  Vegetables 14.8 49.8 71.6 4.0 
  Sugar, jam and confectionery 10.6 28.6 89.9 2.3 
  Other food products 9.5 53.7 83.6 5.5 
Beverages and tobacco 9.7 39.9 74.2 2.0 
Clothing and footwear 10.2 98.0 28.9 2.4 
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Fuel and energy 1.8 43.1 47.2 0.4 
Household articles 2.8 65.3 57.7 0.8 
Medical goods 0.1 81.6 73.2 0.5 
Transport vehicles and accessories 7.7 78.6 85.4 5.5 
Audio-visual equipment 2.3 88.4 46.3 1.1 
Items for hobbies and activities 2.1 30.7 54.1 0.4 
Miscellaneous 6.8 54.6 62.5 1.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
If supply prices did not change and consumers could not mitigate the price increases imposed 
on EU goods by substituting away from them, the net effect on prices would merely be the 
product of the EU share of consumption and the EU price increase (i.e. the tariff). The 
substitution we permit reduces the price increase below this notional level, but this effect is 
potentially offset by any increases in the supply price that are induced.26 
The net effects on prices after the substitution between sources are shown in column 4 of table 
3. The largest predicted price change is in ‘dairy products’, followed by ‘oil and fats’ ‘meat’, 
‘other foods’ and ‘transport vehicles and accessories’. The ability to substitute away from EU 
sources once they pay the same tariffs as other suppliers allows consumers to avoid up to one 
third of the cost of the tariff increases, the effect being strongest where the tariff is largest. 
Overall, we estimate that a ‘MFN Brexit’ would increase the consumer prices of goods by 2.7 
per cent. 
It is worth re-iterating that the price increases in column 4 are under-estimates of the effect of 
‘MFN Brexit’ on goods prices. We make no allowance for: 
• Tariffs going up for countries currently in FTAs with the UK; 
• The effect of tariffs on the costs of inputs into UK production; 
• Any frictions arising from exit from the Single Market, such as increased testing and 
certification costs; 
• The costs of increased border formalities; 
• The fact that the reduction in competition in the UK market might allow other suppliers 
to ease their prices up, an effect that Winters and Chang (2000) and Chang and Winters 
(2002) identified in Spain and Mercosur, and 
• Any tendency for the EU to sell certain agricultural products in the UK at world prices 
plus the MFN tariff rather than at the internal EU prices that prevailed before Brexit. 
And, of course, no estimate is made at all of the export, production and income effects of Brexit. 
That is, the 2.7 per cent is a price change, just one component of the real income changes that 
may follow Brexit. 
Clearly the results above depend on the elasticities that we have assumed in this exercise. But 
it turns out that they are pretty robust to changing the assumed values. Halving supply 
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elasticities lowers the average increase in consumer prices to 2.6 per cent, while halving the 
substitution elasticities pushes it up to 2.8 per cent and neither changes the pattern across 
commodities materially. 
 
4.2. Impact of Price Changes on Different Groups 
Two factors determine how a household is affected by an increase in tariffs. The first is the 
price changes outlined above, which range from around 8 per cent for ‘dairy products’ to 
around 0.4 per cent for ‘fuel and energy’. The second is the consumption pattern of the 
household. The latter is derivable from consumption data drawn from the 2014 Living Costs 
and Food Survey (LCFS).27 As with the estimates of the exchange rate effects of the EU 
Referendum, we assume that all households face the same price changes. 
Table 4 reports the consumption patterns of a range of different household types by the 18 
summary product groups used above, but the actual calculations are conducted on the 215 COI+ 
categories of consumption referring to goods.28 The calculated price changes cover up to 40 
per cent of consumption for the average household. Columns 2 to 10 detail how much different 
households spend on these product groups as a proportion of their total spending. For instance 
households headed by someone who is unemployed spend 15.7 per cent of their total weekly 
expenditure on food, whereas households headed by someone in full- time work spend just 9.8 
per cent. Column 11 provides the average for all households. It is important to bear in mind 
that the figures below are averages and many households will spend very little, or often nothing 
at all, on many non-essential items. Although mean household spending on household articles 
(such as furniture and homeware) is 4.5 per cent, the typical (median) family spends just 2.8 
per cent of their total expenditure on such items. Even for essential items, families with highly 
concentrated expenditure pull up the average. Mean spending on food is 12.5 per cent, whereas 
the median family spends 10.9 per cent. As we shall see below, this has an impact on the extent 
to which different families are affected by price rises. 
These consumption patterns determine how much each household is affected by price rises. 
Table 5 estimates the change in spending as a proportion of each household’s original (pre-
tariff rise) spending on each product group. Thus, spending on clothing is expected to rise by 
2.2 per cent for a single person household, below the average rise of 2.6 per cent (detailed in 
column 11). However, spending on clothing for households headed by an unemployed person 
is expected to rise by 2.9 per cent. 
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Table 4: Spending on key categories of goods as a share of total household spending 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Living Costs and Food Survey 2014 
 
Table 5: Overall impact of price changes on household spending power and for key categories of 
goods 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Living Costs and Food Survey 2014. 
Employed 
Full-time
Employed 
Part-time Unemployed Single
Single 
parent Couple
Couple with 
children Working-age Pensioner All
Total food 9.8% 12.1% 15.7% 13.5% 15.0% 11.8% 12.0% 12.3% 16.3% 12.5%
     Bread and cereals 1.1% 1.5% 1.9% 1.5% 1.9% 1.2% 1.5% 1.4% 1.7% 1.4%
     Meat 2.4% 2.8% 4.8% 3.4% 3.7% 2.9% 2.8% 3.1% 4.1% 3.1%
     Fish 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6%
     Milk, cheese and eggs 1.2% 1.6% 1.9% 1.8% 2.0% 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 2.3% 1.7%
     Oils and fats 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2%
     Fruit 0.8% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.4% 1.1%
     Vegetables 1.5% 1.9% 2.5% 1.9% 2.3% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 2.2% 1.9%
     Sugar, jam and confectionery 1.4% 1.9% 1.7% 2.0% 2.3% 1.7% 1.8% 1.8% 2.7% 1.8%
     Other food products 0.7% 0.8% 1.2% 0.7% 1.1% 0.7% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%
Beverages and tobacco 3.1% 4.0% 6.2% 4.1% 3.7% 3.7% 3.2% 3.8% 3.2% 3.8%
Clothing 4.1% 4.4% 3.3% 2.4% 6.3% 3.7% 4.7% 3.8% 2.8% 3.8%
Fuel and energy 5.1% 4.9% 3.0% 3.3% 3.9% 5.0% 5.1% 4.6% 3.4% 4.5%
Household articles 4.2% 4.4% 3.6% 3.9% 5.5% 4.7% 4.6% 4.5% 4.2% 4.5%
Medical goods 0.6% 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Audiovisual equipment 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.8% 1.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.7%
Transport vehicles 5.0% 4.1% 2.0% 3.1% 2.7% 4.9% 4.5% 4.3% 2.4% 4.2%
Items for activities 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.5% 1.1% 1.4% 1.0% 1.3% 1.9% 1.3%
Miscellaneous 1.6% 1.7% 1.1% 1.8% 1.5% 2.2% 1.5% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8%
35.3% 38.1% 37.2% 34.6% 40.4% 39.0% 38.2% 37.8% 37.2% 37.8%
64.7% 61.9% 62.8% 65.4% 59.6% 61.0% 61.8% 62.2% 62.8% 62.2%Excluded spending
Economic status of HRP Household composition Age
Share of spending
Sum of included groups
Employed 
Full-time
Employed 
Part-time Unemployed Single
Single 
parent Couple
Couple with 
children Working-age Pensioner All
Total food 4.3% 4.3% 4.8% 4.3% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4% 4.3% 4.2% 4.3%
     Bread and cereals 1.8% 1.9% 1.8% 2.0% 1.8% 1.9% 1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 1.9%
     Meat 5.5% 5.6% 5.7% 5.4% 5.3% 5.6% 5.5% 5.5% 5.7% 5.5%
     Fish 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
     Dairy products 7.9% 7.7% 8.8% 7.3% 7.8% 7.6% 8.3% 7.8% 7.0% 7.7%
     Oils and fats 7.3% 6.5% 5.4% 5.9% 5.9% 7.0% 6.7% 6.8% 6.0% 6.7%
     Fruit 2.9% 3.1% 2.9% 3.2% 2.8% 3.1% 2.9% 3.0% 3.4% 3.1%
     Vegetables 3.9% 3.7% 3.3% 4.0% 3.2% 4.0% 3.7% 3.9% 3.7% 3.8%
     Sugar, jam and confectionery 2.4% 2.5% 3.2% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.5%
     Other food products 5.5% 5.5% 6.4% 4.6% 6.0% 4.7% 5.6% 5.2% 3.4% 5.1%
Beverages and tobacco 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.2% 1.8% 2.1% 1.9% 2.2% 2.0%
Clothing and footwear 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 2.2% 3.5% 2.3% 3.2% 2.6% 2.4% 2.6%
Fuel and energy 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Household articles 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9%
Medical goods 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Audiovisual equipment 0.8% 0.6% 2.9% 1.4% 1.1% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.5% 0.8%
Transport vehicles 4.9% 5.2% 4.7% 4.8% 5.1% 4.7% 4.9% 4.8% 4.4% 4.8%
Items for hobbies and activities 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Miscellaneous 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0%
Expenditure impacted by tariffs 2.5% 2.6% 3.0% 2.7% 2.7% 2.4% 2.7% 2.6% 2.8% 2.6%
Total expenditure 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% 0.8% 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9%
Annual increase in cost of living £318 £273 £178 £121 £157 £286 £349 £263 £128 £257
Economic status of HRP Household composition Age
Change in the value of spending per product 
group
Overall impact of prices changes
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The last three rows of table 5 detail the overall impact of tariff rises on household spending, 
first as a share of spending on the goods affected by tariff rises, second as a share of total 
expenditure and then in terms of the annual impact in monetary terms. Some households – 
those headed by someone in full-time employment or by a single person with no children – see 
spending rises below the average, but others – particularly those headed by someone who is 
unemployed, those with children or retired households – fare worse than the average.29 
The cross-household variation in the effect of tariff rises is far greater for the individual product 
groups than in terms of overall expenditure: large increases in spending in one product category 
are often offset by a smaller increase in another.30 Across groups as broad as those above there 
will be households that allocate a significant share of their spending to products that are 
particularly affected by tariff changes, but the majority will consume tradeable goods in similar 
proportions to the rest of the population. 
When we look at the distribution of price impacts by household (within the LCFS sample) we 
get a better sense of the number of households that allocate a significant proportion of their 
spending to heavily traded goods and so are particularly vulnerable to tariff changes. Figure 5 
shows the distribution of UK households by increases in weekly expenditure. Thirty per cent 
of households experience spending increases similar to those experienced by the groups above 
of between 0.8 and 1.1 per cent. For the majority of households (71 per cent) spending increases 
by between 0.5 and 1.5 per cent. However, there is a sizeable minority, representing 2 million 
or 8 per cent of the households in the UK that experience increases in their weekly expenditure 
of between 2 and 4.7 per cent. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of price changes as a share of total expenditure for UK 
households 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Living Costs and Food Survey 2014. 
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Within this group there will be many higher income families for whom such an increase has 
little impact on their living standards. Yet there will also be many for which an increase of 
between 2 and 4.7 per cent represents a significant chunk of their weekly expenditure. For 
instance, based on the real (2016–17 prices) median level of total weekly consumption 
expenditure in the UK in 2016–17, a 2 to 4.7 per cent rise would equate to an increase in the 
cost of living of £400 to £930, which, if incomes were held constant, would translate into a loss 
of real income of these magnitudes.31 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is the most detailed attempt we know of to calculate the cost of living consequences 
of Brexit. We have tackled it first by looking at the price inflation that followed the Brexit-
induced devaluation that started the day after the EU Referendum. Inflation increased by 1.9 
percentage points over the following year. 
Second, we examined the case in which the UK starts to levy tariffs on its imports of goods 
from the EU.  The overall increase in price in the affected goods is estimated to be 2.7 per cent 
and this translates into an increase in the overall cost of living of 0.8 to 1.1 per cent for a typical 
family, with the unemployed and families, those with children and pensioners hit hardest. This 
may seem a small number, but in a country in which the real incomes of ordinary families have 
been stagnant for several years, a loss of this order would have a significant effect on welfare. 
Moreover, it is a very conservative estimate: we deal only with goods, not the over 60 per cent 
of expenditure on services; we ignore increases in UK costs of production; we ignore the 
probable increase in other suppliers’ prices as EU suppliers suffer a decline in competitiveness, 
and we ignore the inevitable increase in non-tariff frictions in UK–EU trade. Moreover, prices 
are only one part of the shock to real incomes that a ‘MFN Brexit’ would entail. 
 
Notes 
1 On 21 August 2017, ahead of the third round of Article 50 negotiations in Brussels, the 
Department for Exiting the European Union published the position papers outlining the 
UK’s negotiating approach to goods on the market, and to confidentiality and access to 
official documents. The UK position papers published to date are available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/article-50-and-negotiations-with-the-eu.    
The position papers and other negotiating documents published by the European 
Commission – as part of the European Commission’s approach to transparency on Article 
50 negotiations with the UK – are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/brexit-
negotiations/negotiating-documents-article- 50-negotiations-united-kingdom_en. 
2 Kristin Forbes, Ida Hjortsoe and Tsvetelina Nenova, ‘The shocks matter: improving our 
estimates of exchange rate pass-through’, External MPC Unit Discussion Paper 43, 
November 2015. 
3 This refers to the narrow effective exchange rate index published by the Bank of 
England. 
4 See Gasiorek et al. (2017) for details. 
5 Among the losses to data unavailability are Australia and New Zealand in the RHIC group, 
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and South Africa, Brazil and Russia in the EM group. 
6 We also have versions of the model allowing for different types of oligopolistic behaviour 
in supply, but because these rely on a larger set of parameters for which we have no 
estimates we use the simpler version here. 
7 The ONS provides data on the indirect import content embodied in elements of final 
domestic demand for different products classified according to Classification of Product 
by Activity (CPA). These data can be mapped to Classification of Individual Consumption 
According to Purpose (COICOP). See Levell et al. (2017) for further details. 
8 Following collection, data also needed to be ‘cleaned’. Data cleaning processes involved 
in the preparation of final data matrices are discussed in the Appendix. 
9 The OECD SDBS database is available at: http://stats.oecd. 
org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SSIS_BSC_ISIC4. The UNIDO INDSTAT4 database is 
available at: https://stat.unido.org/. 
10 The FAO database on agricultural production is available at: 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC. 
11 The difference in base-year for the manufacturing and agricultural groups is probably 
of little consequence because price changes depend fundamentally on the shares of 
different suppliers in the market and these evolve only slowly. 
12 The WITS website is available at: http://wits.worldbank.org/. 
13 The native classification for 2014 was HS2012, but WITS provides for easy conversion 
between different product nomenclatures, enabling us to collect trade data in HS2007 
which we can more readily relate to the other classifications. 
14 The FAO database on agricultural trade is available at: http:// 
www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TP. 
15 HS Combined combines all revisions of the HS. 
16 For example, in 2014 fresh bananas imported to the EU incurred a specific duty of 
€132/1000kg over and above ad valorem duty of 16 per cent. 
17 The calculation is outlined in: https://www.wto.org/english/ 
res_e/publications_e/wto_unctad12_e.pdf. 
18 On 23 January 2017, the UK government announced its intention to replicate current EU 
tariffs to the maximum extent possible; see: 
https://blogs.fco.gov.uk/julianbraithwaite/2017/01/23/ ensuring-a-smooth-transition-
in-the-wto-as-we-leave-the-eu/. 
19 See: https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/2017/04/19/will- eliminating-uk-tariffs-boost-
uk-gdp-by-4-percent/. 
20 OECD, Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use ISIC Rev.4 conversion key. 
21 To the best of our knowledge, an official conversion key that links FAOSTAT’s commodity 
categories to COI+ does not exist, so we linked both classifications manually. In most cases, 
we established 1:1 links between FAOSTAT and COI+ categories. In a small number of 
cases, however, data had to be apportioned across categories. For example, FAO’s ‘mangoes, 
mangosteens, guavas’ could be mapped to COI+ ‘Stone fruits – fresh’ and COI+ ‘Other 
fresh, chilled or frozen fruits’. 
22 There is some tension here because FAO is concerned to measure only the output of crops 
whereas the related COI+ definition also includes the consumption of lightly processed 
products. We have no output data for the latter, but it is frequently the tariffs on such 
products that affect consumers most directly. As an example, FAO rice refers to rice in the 
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husk, whereas the consumer category rice also includes husked, milled and broken rice. 
Mixing the definitions seems to be the best compromise. 
23 For example, ‘2660 Irradiation / electromedical equipment,etc’. and ‘3020 Railway 
locomotives and rolling stock’ are among the manufacturing ISIC4 groups that do not match 
to any COI+ category. 
24 These are not standard groups from any official publication, but have been designed by the 
authors to best summarise the consumption and trade policy issues we are dealing with. 
25 If imports do figure less prominently in direct consumption than in total UK purchases of 
the goods we model, we may thus slightly overstate the vulnerability of consumers to tariff 
changes. However, identifying precisely where consumers’ purchases come from is not 
possible. 
26 In addition, the numerical effects of pushing the results at the ISIC level through the 
converters and aggregators described above to reach the summary product groups, results 
in some spill-over between categories. This makes it difficult to see the price reducing effect 
of substitution directly in some summary product groups. 
27 The data for 2015/16 were not available when the exercise was started. 
28 There are two minor adjustments to the estimates of price changes before they enter the 
household stage: first, seven COI+ categories refer to hire or rent of goods and for these 
we assume that their prices increase by three-quarters of   the amount by which the goods 
they hire increase; second, alcohol and fuels are subject to excise taxes which we assume 
are unchanged, so that the percentage increases in the prices experienced by consumers are 
correspondingly smaller than the increases in import prices. 
29 Those where the household reference person is retired or of minimum NI pension age. 
30 This results from the fact that expenditure shares have to sum to one. At this point we 
model no explicit substitution by consumers away from goods that have become relatively 
more expensive. 
31 Typical (median) total household consumption spending in 2015–16 was £19,500, uprated 
to 2016–17 prices is £19,770. 
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